

#20

What do we think of replacement of Hoa Hao,
Cao Dai PC's! (see Embassy, State)
vcs, 4th, 2nd see note: OSD does.

Any disadvantages? [see OSD]

What would be our wishes of "disruption
report"? What are our presumptions?

(No one mentioned that new PC is a Catholic;
changes of complexion, attitude of advisors,
in Tay Ninh; or, dropping of Saigon.)

OSD - "serious repercussions"

CIA - Cao Dai are distrustful

"No" serious anti-gov feeling because of changes!
(Evidence?) How about loss of opp. for
good-will?

[What positions are now held by 25 ousted
PC's?]

OSD -

21 (22) Dal attitudes

Adequacy of info.

Emb. good (Buddhist? Professors? Youth?)

Emb. covers only on info, not content.

* [Need for all-source file on RVNAR-GVN-elites
biogs, attitudes] [See State]

State: need more on Dai Vits!

[Study: impact - e.g. on alignment - of corruption]

Comar State: ranking of info on groups - to Embassy

[State/CIA counts on OSD?] or JCS

[But Emb counts; Harris]

CIA: "distaste, dislike, for prospect of Com rule."

OSD: ARVN best accepts legit. of gov
other just bandy

How may VNC believe US ~~Wishes~~
or GVN

was suspected.

Van
Thien
Dien
Ky clique
Edm. Martin

[Are Northern Catholics all that hardish?

- How would different groups fare?
- Consequences of various compromises? ^{mil} Polit *
- Engagement: acceptance of NLF as party? (OSD vs. State)

What would an "opposition" be?

Est on Am Ques, youth, unions

Poss. of "accommodation" with VC

22

C/S: don't expect further broadening

Embassy: very broad Cabinet.

CO, CA: don't overplay competence factor
in PC changes.

Embassy - HH, CD don't have leaders capable of Cabinet
State - more than a handful

State (Embassy): increase powers of Prov Councils
(allow NCF ?)

State, C/S emphasize difficulty of measuring political
mob.

State questions whether broadening representation
leads to greater pop commitment.

(Facility focuses only on relation of "gov"
to individual: "Can the gov provide security?")

Then: Will the gov treat people decently, or at least
then alone, educate their children, or make it

possible for people to market their rice or obtain a fair price in return?

[Nothing on: "Who is gov?" ^{region, character, aim, religion} What relation to local, trusted leaders? People's voice in quiverous, official appointments. Intent of gov. Relation to foreigners, diplomacy. (religious relationships)]

[Commitment by local leaders; youth; ambitions.]

Expenditure on "providing security."

(by RVNAF)

State: If security, the increasing mobilization, based on performance of RVNAF, will prob evolve. (1961)

State: US could discourage free-riding by unilateral support to "Jahn + Ky."

"Can't include An Quang Bonds." + CIA, Embassy (OSD?)

(CIA on next question: mil improvement can neither compensate nor cure habit/adm shortcomings)

#24 - 23

JCS - hold prov council elections (all agree?)

- even some PCs elected!

- give councils more power

Chavez "important" — but US cannot roll
essential: must be no early unilateral reduction
of US effort. (must maintain US role and improve
RVNAF).

OSD: (like JCS): all NVNese, including fillers and
regroupees!
and all from Laos & Cambodia

OSD mdy week

C/A (vs. State on previous: mil effort will not produce
civil mobilization: nor anything else! So rely on
RVNAF!

Embassy: Need for unity critical "if US effort is reduced", not, to achieve US objectives at current level of US forces.

i.e. broadening gov

[not, to achieve "victory" — or "post-hostilities non-con role" ?] [Polit mob is needed]

Needed to cushion effects of US reduction
(yes)

Emb favors broadening. (Not CIA?)

State, OSD agree "victory is unattainable"

State: Unilateral reduction lessens prob. of
polit mob

[see comments on impact of US ^{new} policy
other mems]

CINCPAC

"The greatest single factor determining popular support in any area is the presence of US/GVN or NVA/VC forces. The people generally tend to support whatever side is in military control."

#2 Uncertain: "judgment, not evidence"

On public views of Asians: how much influenced by the view of what US wanted them to say publicly — or pressed them to say?

What means "accommodation"? In what ways against US interests? (What price should we pay to avoid? What would we have to pay?)

Issue: ⁽²⁾ would US policy after Com takeover in SVN be critical to posture of other SEA leaders, or ^{INR} not? ^{EA, Embassy}

(3) Is outcome in VN itself ^{determinative} critical to attitudes? would it have strong immediate impact on behavior of Com insurgents, or leaders (or ^{VN} their DRV?)

INR view - on downfall of RTG?

- on reasons for public statements?

EA on NIE

#3 Agree: no pressures on DRV

Oct 11 - DRV first clear indication they would
accept the GVN talks (which "series
talks" didn't want!), confirmed by SV 12 Oct.

has suggested formula on setting, in Jan 69.

S.A

End: Withdrawal — exclusively mil. reasons, though
pol. benefits

No effort to "signal."

VC guerrillas dominant: "hoarding resources to
give themselves option of a "chiaping" offensive.

State: Kanoi did signal.

Id want "satisfied Cons and ~~to~~ to demonstrate
continuing initiative

State Cons may feel that a drastically strong blow vs.
poc program would have wide repercussions,
particularly at time of optimistic Allied claim about
poc successes.

On RVNAF

Test is what RVNAF could do without US, vs. VC

MACV rates RVNAF ability highest

VC threat lowest 36,000

(VC severity down, morale low,

leadership shot, dependent on NVA)

Get without US, not until 1972 could RVNAF
face VC alone

835/30

$$\begin{array}{r} 23 \\ 36 \overline{) 825} \\ \underline{72} \\ 105 \\ \underline{108} \end{array}$$

Sans:

ask

#1

Question on Harai ais + concessions

#9 Agree on Com capability
and intent to hit pos

MACV/JCS don't estimate effort
State, Embassy do
(also SN/E)

10A

Agree with pers. C/A est

10A

50A

1967

1968

daytime SV contents :

3089

813

nighttime

8233

6330

2 ballfield practices (.05% of all practices)

~ 1956; 56 - 4% - ~ 1967;

195 - 3% - ~ 1968.


Barley destroyed capital stock, mil. facilities,
current production : NVN - \$500 million

SC- Chien and \$2.9 B

◇

0730

- Thru



On bombing:

What is est. of effect on VC/NVA capability
in SVN if bombing in Laos were halted?

On probable VC/NVA infilt, actions?

Cost difference?

How could SU escalate?

(rockets, etc.)

est. 52,000 civs in NVN killed

VC/NVA reqs. for arms + ammo: 30-50 tons/day
(10-15 trucks)


DE Files

2
Maj. Cann 3B278 77396

28. C/A vs JCS on impact in Laos.

(JCS: reduced roadnet capacity

C/A — looks at log. requirements, flow?



4 out of 9 indicators in military dropping

■ e.g. platoon attack
some mortaring
and assass

would take ~~off~~ security category
down into 0

Disputes

2. CIA, INR vs. Mil, EA
4. Cliques (agor, unctari)
- 5a C/A vs. MACV...
- * 5c gemelles domant? why? C/A, MACV vs. Embassy
- X 8 OB CIA/DIA vs. MACV DCI
- X 10 Cambodia all vs MACV/VCS DCI
- X 10A-11 RVNAF
RVNAF vs. VC
11. C/A/INR vs. MACV
- X 15-16 VC capt. vs. APC: expect. of progress C/A MACV
- X 16-17 C Rukits, C/A MACV
- 19-20 info on damage C/A, INR Emb, MACV
- 23-24 How to mob, need for C/A vs. State vs OSD
- X 25-26 reduce OSD vs. MACV
- 26-27 B-52
- 27-28 Laos C/A, OSD DCI
- 28-29 D. Southern DRV DCI
- d. interdiction CC aid C/A vs. DCI

Agreement

1. (uncertain) !

3 (little uncertainty?)

5-6

6 attention !

7 control of attention !

9

11-12 RVNAF vs. NVA

17? VCI !

18 VCI

20 Impact of changes (wrong: except (NR))

21-22 info on attitudes, alignment

22-23? polit. mov. (bad)

28-29 2. handling of NVA !?

C. 30-CC and

C. 2000 of NVA

Uncertainties

1. (little dispute)
2. + dispute
- 4
- 6 ~~response~~ (agreed?)
- 8 OB dispute DCI
- 10 Cambodia DCI
- 10A (III) RVNAF
- 11-12 RVNAF vs. VC
- 15 (VC caps vs. APC)

- [Not asked: - Why VC log off APC
^{what} ^{would be}
 - NVN land + ops with no bombing
 - NVN response with earlier bomb belt
 - NVN land + ops with heavier earlier bombing,
 more "strategic interdiction";
 - Why NVN does not exploit full infilt., warware + supply
 capability. - What is ceiling?

JCS C. From 1965-67, there were no significant changes in the RVNAF promotion system; however, there was a substantial increase in the number of promotions during 1967+1968. The overall quality of leadership in RVNAF has experienced some deterioration.

JCS: "Of 1900 noncommissioned officers commissioned as aspirants in 1968, indications are that 99% did not have high school diplomas."

(Van: Lie)

d. The MACV has no firm evidence of widespread looting. [Set 68] [Van: Lie.] Eight RVNAF personnel were brought to trial for related offenses in 1968. Minor thing is handled at the local level."

list "findings," dissent, etc. esp. relevant
to choices

1. e.g. to escalation

- bombing
- Cambodia

detailed summary

2. To MW

RVNAF vs.

VC

- + pillars
- + NVA

with US combat support

detailed
summary

3. To military reduction:

- not much

questions

(e.g. effect on US committee

effect on RVNAF/GVN

4. Pol. without: not enough

questions

Current strategy:

HES

APC

RVAAF informant

Pac

Attition

Shocks

#8 OB: ranges don't overlap.

MACV "methodology"; "conservation"

-

- RVNAF (MACV) have to retrench without US
support even against (MACV est. of) VC, no NVA.

- "No evidence of widespread looting" MACV

1920

- "Civ damage known" MACV, Embassy.

- Reliance on Cambodia MACV

- ~~all~~ 99% NCO-aspirants without Boe

DC/

- OB
- VC recruiting
- Use of Cambodia, Sihanoukville
- E

Form bio file for GVN/RVNAF.

Investigate: scale of damage

joint board:

1. Effects of dropping bombing of Laos



NIE: effects of CS responses to VC attack

Polit. Mob.

C/A

- Create effective national polit. org to provide GVN with dependable, working polit. base.
- Keep RVNAF "cohesive" & disciplined
- Sarris: tie in local orgs to GVN, and strengthen them.

State: demonstrate total support of "Thin" & "Kg".

C/A - "The few ^{remnants of} senioring-group officials have had
no discernible impact."

26. MACV: "There appears to be no acceptable way of reducing US force levels without at least an equal reduction in combat capability."

260720 2 Jan 69

Saigon 8063

Prior to Oct 68 nearly all nationalist leaders assumed that the problem of the NCF would be resolved by the destruction of the NCF as an org.

.... On one point virtually all ~~now~~ now seem agreed: it is not possible to destroy the NCF and it will ultimately be necessary to deal directly with the NCF in some way."

(Dye arrest mid-April; sentence July 26.

Do remarks. Dan 3 plus speech.

Opinion had hardened (shilling of Saigon).

Then, 1 Nov.

Most profess to see: NCF not accept Const, disavow
(Comm ideology, disavow: ... not inevitable

Some groups don't fear success: An Quang,
some long Dao Catlois, few small leftist labor
unions, some radical Southern factions.

"positions rarely articulated, even in private."

dilemma: "nationalists generally remain unable to
envisage any GVN-NLF agreement which the NLF
would accept and which would not at the same
time pose a very grave threat of a Comm takeover
of SVN."

ISA Summary of DOO answers, Feb 69

MACV/JCS/ISA enemy retains ability to conduct independent coord. mil. activities, ... but not on a scale equal to Tet off, and at extremely high price in casualties & supplies.

[

Estimated needs of VC/NVA - 40 tons per day from NVN (half arms & ammo). 20 tons a day.

"We must recognize that our bombing did not, does not, and prob. can not, limit the enemy's ops in SVN. It did & does increase the cost of such ops. More importantly, the enemy has had and still has the capability to increase his infiltr. effort in both men and supplies several-fold.

[Take MACV est of "threat"
and of RVNAF capability,
compare to VC without filler (or with)
and note MACV est. of RVNAF capability.]

Ask Britten:

Total RVNAF desertions = 1 ARVN div. a month

[For 1100 rounds, the VC could undo the
reported APE "progress."] Chael

Hanoi prob. needs overall settlement — wants to tie NV to general pol. settlement — prob. ~~th~~ is expectation we would have to pressure the GVN into making concessions as price for NV. agreement.

Indicated: coalition electoral comm. to run "free elections." expects them to produce NV with NLF having dominant voice, because of org + discipline (not nec. majority of votes).

NA → coal gov, prob. eventually dominated by NLF.

The GVN would not agree to procedures that could yield this result without arm-trust by US. But if Hanoi is unable to obtain these concessions... it will prob. continue the war at current levels.

(US KIA 200/year, though enemy-initiated actions at lowest level in 2 years). Could keep us there.

Sarris:

No time to form new national parties.

Issue: how to tie in existing local groups with roots (and strengthen the locally) into national gov?

Drop EA attitude that it doesn't matter who PC's are.

Bring into

↓ Gives them an ability to bargain with the VC.

("We have troops; local officers, resources; place in national gov — what can you offer us?")

Molly Kriemer OCI — now at SAIS

Tom Latimer OCI upland Moors

AMS.

- ✓ 1. Tone down extreme (Group A) claims.
- ✓ 2. Educate staffs. [Circulate answers]
3. Educate Secs. [See Dept. summaries] EA?
4. Educate Pres. [Summary: "Anthology" ; uncertainties, disagreements] Cover memo
5. Tasks for DCI; S (e.g. OB, Colombia)
6. SNIE's.
7. New questions.
8. Studies. Political groups, accommodation, coop. with NCF.
9. Policy recommendations (e.g. downplay APC/HES).
10. Org in Work?
11. Info system. Bio file. ^{Indicators?} Non-claim of command: State?
12. Base of data on concepts, criteria, issues, on which to interpret future claims, reports, estimates
Send around

Uncertainties

- #1: Why in Paris? (little disagreement)
- #4: Line-up in DRV are disagreement
- #6: Early manpower balance C/A (but agreed)
- #8: OB (+ disagreement)

questions

VC - GVN manpower pools

(recruiting?)

#21 - pol. attitudes of:

- on NLF, communists ...
- RVNAF pol. objectives
- war measures, desire for peace
- knowledge of family ties, corruption, secret org or party

Scale of

#19: Damage to civs: esp. in VC + contested areas.

#23: impact of press talks on RVNAF: desertion, voluntary
or, shifting burden from US to RVNAF

#12 (+ disagreement)

Disagreements

#7

#8

OB

VC meeting

Minh Tam pools, VC + GVN

#10

Use of Cambodia

" "

Sihanoukville

10(A)

RVNAF informant

IOA & Deception CIA vs. State...

MACV/
26 - OSD - JCS on reduction

27 - MACV vs OSD, State, CIA on B-52's

#11 MACV vs CIA: can RVNAF handle VC?

14. MACV vs. OSD: what required for RVNAF to counter VC

- effects of reduced US effort on GVN: OSD ^{#14}

- 15(19) End vs. State: control changes.

VN question, Feb 69

CINCPAC : "The VC political operations will continue to struggle and hide, probably for years, but it is being defeated."